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RESEARCH BRIEF
Temporal Sequencing, Incident Sophistication, and Terrorist Outcomes
OVERVIEW
There have been few efforts to examine how the planning process affects the outcome of a terrorist plot. This research brief
provides some preliminary findings from an examination of the impact of the length of the planning process, the impact of
multiple participants, and the volume of precursor activity on the success or failure of terrorist plots in the United States.
While conventional wisdom holds true that a shorter planning process and fewer preparatory activities reduces perpetrators
chances of getting caught therefore increases success rate, the new findings show that the more people involved in the
planning process also increases the probability of success.
DATA
Data from the American Terrorism Study were used for this analysis. Analysis was conducted on 504 terrorism plots in the
United States from 1980-2015. Data included measurements on the following variables:
 Success – Each plot was evaluated to determine whether it was successfully carried out, partially successful, or was foiled
or failed. For this analysis, “successful” and “partially successful” plots were compared to those that were foiled or failed.
Incidents were coded as “unsuccessful” when activity on the intended target was prevented or failed to occur due to plot
cancellation, complete device failure, or human intervention.
 Number of participants – measured as the total number of participants involved in the terrorism plot. This number includes
not only those indicted for committing the terrorist act, but also those involved in any planning or preparatory act associated
with the plot. Unindicted co-conspirators are included in this measure.
 Number of preparatory acts – measured as the total number of known activities related to the planning or preparation of
the planned incident (e.g., meetings, purchase or theft of weapons, etc.). Only confirmed preparatory activities were
counted; other “antecedent” activities (such as meetings in
which the specific plot was not discussed) were excluded.
Extremist Plot Type
 Length of the planning process – was determined by measuring
the number of days from the first identified “preparatory”
activity to the date of the planned incident.
Far-right
Data for the analysis included information from:
o 132 far-right terrorism plots
o 84 far-left plots
o 75 Islamist extremist plots, and
o 126 environmental extremist plots.

Far-left
Islamist
Environmental

The remaining plots include activities by a variety of other
nationalist/separatist groups as well as some single-issue plots, all
of which occurred in the United States.

Other

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Detailed below, a summary of our significant conclusions, are:


Terrorists who engage in a significantly shorter planning and preparation cycle have the greatest probability of success.



The greater the number of preparatory acts required for commission of a terrorist incident, the greater the probability of
failure.



Contrary to most expectations, the fewer the number of persons involved in the preparation process, the lower the rate
of success.
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LENGTH OF THE PLANNING AND PREPAR ATION PROCESS
Length of the planning process is the most difficult variable to measure, requiring time-stamped data for both the first planning
activity and the date of the planned incident. Consequently, analysis could only be conducted on 262 (51.9%) of the incidents
using this variable. Of these, nearly two-thirds (64.9%) of the plots were partially or completely successful, while slightly over
one-third (35.1%) were unsuccessful.

Table 1: Incident Success by Length of the Planning Process
Number of Days
0-21 Days
22-90 Days
91-120 Days
Over 120 Days
Total

Unsuccessful

Partially/Fully Successful

Row Totals

16.7%
(n=10)
34.0%
(n=16)
62.5%
(n=10)
40.3%
(n=56)
35.1%
92

83.3%
(n=50)
66.0%
(n=31)
37.5%
(n=6)
59.7%
(n=83)
64.9%
170

22.9%
(n=60)
17.9%
(n=47)
6.1%
(n=16)
53.1%
(n=139)
100%
262

X2 = 15.88, df = 3, p < 001.
As Table 1 reveals, terrorists who engaged in the shortest planning cycle had the highest rates of success. Plots where known
preparatory behaviors were limited to the three-week period prior to the incident were very likely to be successfully completed
(83.3%).
This success rate steadily declined for group or individuals who engaged in preparatory behaviors up to three or four months
prior to the planned incident (with success rates of 66% and 37.5%, respectively). However, success rates climbed after this
point, rising to nearly 60 percent for terrorists who engaged in planning activities longer than four months.
NUMBER OF PREPARATOR Y BEHAVIORS AND SUCC ESS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS
If there are fewer precursor behaviors for law enforcement officials to observe, it seems reasonable to assume that terrorists
would have a greater chance to successfully complete the planned incident. Our results reveal that to be an accurate
assessment. Our measurements represent a conservative count of the volume of precursor, preparatory behavior by terrorists in
these incidents. However, they do accurately represent the precursor conduct known to law enforcement and prosecutorial
agencies as a result of the investigative process. Most of these behaviors are either listed as counts against the defendants or
as overt acts of the conspiracy in the indictment. The number of preparatory acts was determined on 342 of the 504 incidents
examined.

Table 2: Incident Success by Number of Preparatory Acts
Number of Known
Preparatory Acts
0-2
3 -5
6 -10
More than 10
Total

Unsuccessful

Partially/Fully Successful

Row Totals

32.0%
(n=47)
39.1%
(n=25)
46.0%
(n=23)
76.5%
(n=62)
45.9%
157

68.0%
(n=100)
60.9%
(n=39)
54.0%
(n=27)
23.5%
(n=19)
54.1%
185

43.0%
(n=147)
18.7%
(n=64)
14.6%
(n=50)
23.7%
(n=81)
100%
342

X2 = 43.32, df = 3, p < 001.
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The findings in Table 2 are consistent with our expectations. The more preparatory activities the terrorists engaged in prior to an
incident, the greater the probability of failure. Success rates consistently declined the more preparatory activities were required
to carry out the incident. Incidents with two or fewer known preparatory activities were successful 68 percent of the time,
compared to a 23.5 percent success rate if the group or individual engaged in more than 10 preparatory acts. If one can
assume that the more sophisticated a planned incident is, the more preparatory acts are required to carry it out successfully. If
this is correct, these findings suggest, fortunately, that while simple, smaller acts of terrorism are more likely to go undetected,
more sophisticated planned terrorism incidents are more likely to attract the attention of law enforcement and eventually be
thwarted. Although more research on this subject is warranted, these findings perhaps also indicate why many terrorists are
trending toward simpler attacks against softer targets.
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS AND INCIDENT SUCCESS
Many different types of terrorist groups have adopted an “uncoordinated violence” strategy in the past 20 years - from the
“leaderless resistance” model advocated by the extreme right to the “self-radicalization” of Islamist militants by ISIS. Although
law enforcement agencies have decried the advent of the “lone actor” or “lone wolf” strategy as a means to avoid detection, it
has not been clear whether the phenomenon is really as effective as it has been purported to be. We previously reported that
“lone actors” had a significantly lower success rate than did members of groups or cells. In the current analysis, we use a
different method of measuring participation. For this brief, we counted the number of persons who were not only involved in the
commission of the actual terrorism incident, but also those who were involved in any participatory conduct. Data were coded on
475 of the 504 incidents in the sample.

Table 3: Incident Success by Number of Participants
Number of Participants
One
Two or Three
Four or More
Total

Unsuccessful
49.8%
(n=102)
39.4%
(n=52)
26.8%
(n=37)
40.2%
191

Partially/Fully Successful
50.2%
(n=103)
60.6%
(n=80)
73.2%
(n=101)
59.8%
284

Row Totals
43.2%
(n=205)
27.8%
(n=132)
29.1%
(n=138)
100%
475

X2 = 18.11, df = 2, p < 001.
Overall, 43 percent of the terrorist incidents were carried out by lone actors. Although not shown here, the percentage of
incidents carried out alone has been increasing since the mid-1990s. However, the strategy does not appear to be as
successful as it has been reported. Consistent with our early comparison between “lone actors” and “cells/groups,” the current
analysis reveals a consistent finding that success rates increase with the addition of more participants. While there may be a
threshold where additional members become a detriment to success, it is clear that terrorists who had help in preparing for an
incident have greater success than those who “go it alone.” Although the dynamics of this finding needs further study, it may be
that this is related to the number of preparatory acts necessary to carry out a successful terrorist attack. If the number of
preparatory behaviors for an attack is relatively constant regardless of the number of members, having fewer participants
requires that “lone wolves” commit all of these preparatory acts by themselves. Multiple participants allows these preparatory
acts to be committed by several persons, thereby diluting the possibility that the precursor conduct would come to the attention
of law enforcement. Although this is largely conjecture, it provides the most logical explanation for this controversial finding.
ABOUT THE AMERICAN TERRORI SM STUDY
The American Terrorism Study (ATS) is led by researchers at the Terrorism Research Center at the University of Arkansas. The
ATS is an empirical relational database consisting of data on federal terrorism-related court cases, persons indicted in these
court cases, and related officially designated terrorism incidents. Included in the TEVUS portal are data from court case, person,
organization, affiliation, incident, and precursor activity (antecedent) tables in the ATS. Variables included cover demographic
information, terrorist group to which the individual belongs, and temporal and geospatial data on incidents and antecedent
activities.
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The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is supported in part by the Science and Technology
Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through a Center of Excellence program based at the University of Maryland. START
uses state‐of‐the‐art theories, methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics
and social and psychological impacts of terrorism. For more information, contact START at infostart@start.umd.edu or visit
www.start.umd.edu.
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